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FEDERAL AND STATE
PROTECTION AGAINST
COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION
OF ENDANGERED WILDLIFE
Introduction
At a time of expanding ecological consciousness, it is profitable to
consider the following statement concerning yet another aspect of man's
environmental arrogation.
We need another and a wiser and perhaps a more mystical concept of
animals. Remote from universal nature and living a complicated artifice,
man in civilization surveys creatures through the glass of his knowledge
and sees thereby a feather magnified and the whole image in distortion.
We patronize them for their incompleteness, for their tragic fate of hav-
ing taken form so far below ourselves. And therein we err, we greatly
err. For the animal shall not be measured by man. In a world older and
more complete than ours, they move, finished and complete, gifted
with extensions of the senses we have lost or never attained, living by
voices we shall never hear. They are not brethen, they are not under-
lings, they are other nations caught with ours in the net of life and
time, fellow prisoners of the splendour and travail of the earth.'
The most reliable data2 indicates that man has been exterminating
wildlife and fish at a rapidly accelerating rate.3 Research by the Inter-
* This article is a student work prepared by Ronald J. Mazzucco, a member of
the ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW and St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
1 H. BESTON, THE OUTERMOST HOUSE. 25 (1931); see S. REP. No. 91-526, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 SENATE REPORT].
2 The principal organ for the dissemination of information on wildlife is the In-
ternational Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN),
with headquarters in Morges, Switzerland. IUCN's Survival Service Commission
publishes the Red Data Book which gives an informational listing of endangered
wildlife and fish.
3 J. FISHER, N. SIMON & J. VINCENT, WILDLIFE IN DANGER 11 (1969) [hereinafter
WILDLIFE IN DANGER] This book was written by the Survival Service Commission
of IUCN and contains a selective analysis of Red Data Book listings. 1969 SENATE
REPORT 2.
national Union for the Conservation of
Nature and Natural Resources [IUCN]
demonstrates that since 1600 A.D. more
than 130 species of mammals and birds
have become extinct.4 Further, approxi-
mately 120 species of mammals and 187
species of birds are presently in danger of
extinction. Today conservationists estimate
that one or two species of mammals and
birds disappear each year.5 According to
the IUCN, seventy-five per cent of the de-
struction of wildlife is caused by man, prin-
cipally through hunting.6
To combat the commercial exploitation
of wildlife, Congress in 1969 enacted the
Endangered Species Conservation Act,7
which prohibited the importation of enu-
merated endangered species. This action
by the United States was appropriate not
only because of its historical role as one
of the world's leaders in conservation, but
because it is one of the largest markets for
the trade of endangered wildlife.8 The
Endangered Species Conservation Act
served as an impetus for the Mason Act,"
4 WILDLIFE IN DANGER 11-12.
5 1969 SENATE REPORT 2.
6 WILDLIFE IN DANGER 13.
7 16 U.S.C. §§ 668aa-ee (1970). Subsection It
of this Act provided that subsections 1-10 of the
Act would be classified within the existing code
provisions of the 1966 Endangered Species Act,
and in addition would amend sections 705, 851,
852a and 852d(a) of title 16 and sections 43, 44,
3054 and 3112 of title 18. 16 U.S.C. §§ 668cc-1
to cc-6 (1970).
8 Hearings on H.R. 4812 Before a Subcomm. on
Fisheries and Wildlife of the House Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 91st. Cong., 1st
Sess., ser. 2, at 77-79 (1969) [hereinafter 1969
House Comm. Hearings].
9 N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 358-a (McKinney
1970).
17 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER 1971
a New York State law, which prohibited
the sale of the skins of certain endangered
species. These acts represent the latest at-
tempt to protect endangered wildlife.
The purpose of this note is to trace the
historical developments that led up to the
Endangered Species Conservation Act and
to analyze its strengths and deficiences;
to demonstrate the significance of the Ma-
son Act and discuss the challenges to its
constitutionality; and to emphasize the
need for international cooperation in the
protection of wildlife from commercial ex-
ploitation.
I. Federal Protection of Wildlife
A. Historical Background
The landmark case of Geer v. Connecti-
cut' 0 in 1896 established that primary
responsibility for wildlife protection rested
with the states. The case involved a state
statute which prohibited the killing of cer-
tain game with the intent to transport it
from the state. The United States Supreme
Court upheld the statute as a valid state
regulation of internal commerce" and
historically traced the concept of ferae
naturae, or sovereign ownership of wild-
life. 2 The state ownership doctrine' 3
10 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
11 The state statute was challenged as an inter-
ference with property that had begun to move as
an article of interstate commerce. The court held
that the state law regulated commerce in game
that was purely internal commerce and distin-
guished it from the federal commerce power. Id.
at 530-32.
12 The court traced the origin of the concept
back to Athenian law, demonstrating that from
the earliest traditions the right to reduce animals
ferae naturae, or animals in the wild, to posses-
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elucidated by the court had an inhibitive
effect on federal wildlife regulation, as
the states interpreted it to mean that they
were the exclusive owners of wildlife
within their borders.1 4 However, a broad
reading of Geer has proven to be unjusti-
fied since the issue resolved was state au-
thority in the absence of federal action.15
Although the state ownership doctrine has
retained some vitality,16 its restrictive ef-
fect on federal activity has been largely
negated.17
Four years after the Geer decision Con-
gress passed an act which restricted the
importation of foreign wild animals and
birds.' 8 This so-called Lacey Act was a
sion had been subject to the control of the law-
giving power. As evolved through Roman law
and English common law the concept places au-
thority over animals ferae naturae with the state.
id. at 522-28.
13 The court concluded from this historical di-
gression that,
[t]he power or control lodged in the State,
resulting from this common ownership, is to be
exercised, like all other powers of government,
as a trust for the benefit of the people....
Id. at 529.
14 Note, Federal Protection of Endangered Wild-
life Species, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1289, 1303 &
nn.100-02 (1970) [hereinafter Federal Protec-
tion].
15 Id. at 1303 & n.103. In discussing the power
of the sovereign over wildlife the court in Geer
noted,
It is also certain that the power which the
colonies thus possessed passed to the States
with the separation from the mother country,
and remains in them at the present day, insofar
as its exercise may not be incompatible with,
or restricted by, the rights conveyed to the fed-
eral government by the Constitution.
161 U.S. at 528 (emphasis added).
16 See cases cited note 86 and 93 infra.
17 Federal Protection, at 1303-04
18 Act of May 25, 1900, ch. 533, § 1-5, 31 Stat.
187.
progressive piece of legislation indicative
of the United States' leadership in wildlife
protection. Although it was an expression
of federal commerce power, the Lacey Act
was intended to apply for the benefit of the
states. 19 As amended in the Federal Tariff
Act of 1930,20 the Lacey Act currently
prohibits 21 the importation of any wild
mammal or bird protected by foreign law
unless such exportation is certified by the
foreign country.22
In 1913 Congress enacted the Migratory
Bird Act, 23 which provided for federal
protection of certain native species of birds.
The 1913 Act was declared unconstitu-
tional by two district courts24 as violative
19 Section 5 of the Lacey Act read in pertinent
part:
That all dead bodies, or parts thereof, of any
foreign game animals, or game or song birds,
the importation of which is prohibited, or the
dead bodies, or parts thereof, of any wild game
animals, or game or song birds transported into
any State or Territory .... shall upon arrival
in such State or Territory be subject to the op-
eration and effect of the laws of such State or
Territory enacted in the exercise of its police
powers, to the same extent and in the same
manner as though such animals or birds had
been produced in such State or Territory....
Id.
20 Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 527, 46 Stat.
527, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1527 (1970).
21 When the Lacey Act provisions were incorpo-
rated into the Endangered Species Conservation
Act, 16 U.S.C. §8 668cc-I to cc-6, a new subsec-
tion was added to clarify that the new legislation
did not supercede or limit the authority of the
Lacey Act.
22 The certification required is an attestation to
the legality of the export according to the ex-
porting country's law from the United States
Consul of the exporting country. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1527(a) (1970).
23 Act of March 4, 1913, ch. 145, 37 Stat. 847.
24 United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288 (D.
of the state ownership doctrine. However,
subsequent legislation 25 similar to the 1913
Act was sustained in Missouri v. Holland
on the basis of federal treaty power.2 6
Justice Holmes' opinion in that landmark
case undermined the significance of the
state ownership doctrine, especially in
cases where there was a conflict with fed-
eral interests.27
Congress extended protection to bald
eagles in 194028 in recognition of the
threatened extinction to the national sym-
bol. Under the commerce power Congress
Kan. 1915); United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154
(E.D. Ark. 1914). Both decisions relied princi-
pally on Geer as depositive of the issue in ques-
tion.
25 Act of July 3, 1918, ch. 128, §§ 2-12, 40 Stat.
755, as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-11 (1970).
26 252 U.S. 416 (1920). The purpose of the 1918
Act was to effectuate a treaty with Great Britain.
The Act was upheld by the court as a necessary
and proper measure executing federal treaty
power under article I, § 8, and the Supremacy
Clause, respectively, of the Constitution.
27 In an often cited passage from that opinion
Justice Holmes remarked:
To put the claim of the State upon title is to
lean upon a slender reed. Wild birds are not in
the possession of anyone; and possession is the
beginning of ownership. The whole foundation
of the State's rights is the presence within their
jurisdiction of birds that yesterday had not ar-
rived, tomorrow may be in another state, and
in a week a thousand miles away. ...
Here a national interest of very nearly the
first magnitude is involved. It can be protected
only by national action in concert with that of
another power. . . . It is not sufficient to rely
upon the States.
252 U.S. 416, 434-35 (1920).
28 Act of June 8, 1940, ch. 278, §§ 1-5, 54 Stat.
250, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 668 (1970). Recent
news of wanton slaughter of eagles set off an
environmental scandal. See NEWSWEEK, Aug. 6,
1971, at 23.
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in 1948 enacted two provisions29 aimed at
protecting wildlife through regulation of
interstate and foreign commerce. The first
law dealt with trade in contraband wild-
life;30 the second provided for clear mark-
ings on all packages containing wildlife.-"
In 1966 Congress passed the Endangered
Species Act2 which authorized federal pur-
chase of private and state lands for the
purpose of conserving, protecting, restor-
ing, or propagating domestically endan-
gered species. 33
The Endangered Species Conservation
29 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 2, 62 Stat.
687, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 43 (1970); Act of
June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 2, 62 Stat. 687, as
amended, 18 U.S.C. § 44 (1970).
30 This provision made it unlawful for any per-
son to deliver, carry, transport, ship, or know-
ingly receive in interstate or foreign commerce
any wild mammal or bird or the dead body, or
part thereof, or the offspring or eggs therefrom,
which had been taken, captured, killed, pur-
chased, sold, possessed, or transported contrary
to any federal, state or foreign law or regulation.
18 U.S.C. § 43 (1970).
31 This provision made it unlawful for anyone
to ship, transport, carry, bring, or convey in
interstate or foreign commerce any package con-
taining wild animals or birds, or the dead bodies
or parts thereof, without plainly marking, label-
ing or tagging such package. 18 U.S.C. § 44
(1970).
32 16 U.S.C. §§ 668aa-ee (1970).
33 1d. To assist in carrying out the purposes of
the Act, the Secretaries of the Interior, Agricul-
ture and Defense-including the various bureaus
and agencies within their departments-were re-
quired to take measures to protect threatened
species of fish and wildlife and, where practicable,
to preserve the habitat of such species in lands
under their jurisdiction. In addition the Act al-
lowed the Secretary of the Interior an appropria-
tion of $5 million annually and an aggregate
appropriation of $15 million to implement the
purposes of the Act, with a $750,000 limitation
on the acquisition of lands or waters for any
one area. Id.
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Act of 1969 incorporated existing law with
revisions and created new provisions aimed
at the curtailment of the commercial ex-
ploitation of endangered species. For the
purpose of cohesiveness the following anal-
ysis of the 1969 Act will be limited to
mammals although birds and fish are in-
cluded within its ambit.
B. Endangered Species Conservation Act
of 1969
The 1969 Act represents the most ex-
tensive federal legislation to date in the
area of endangered wildlife. The major
significance of the Act was its prohibition
of the importation into the United States
of specified endangered species. Although
this unilateral action is seemingly progres-
sive, it suffers from a number of serious
deficiencies which detract from its ef-
fectiveness.
The Senate Report recommending pas-
sage of the Act indicated three basic rea-
sons for the accelerating rate of the
extermination of wildlife . 4 Although recog-
nition was given to the related problems of
destruction of natural habitat, and water
and air pollution, the focus of the Act was
clearly the commercial exploitation of
wildlife. 35 The legislative intent was ex-
plicit, namely that by drying up the inter-
national market for endangered species
the Act would reduce the incidence of
poaching. Similarly, by making illegal in
34 1969 SENATE REPORT 2. See also Hearings on
S.335, S.671, & S.1280 Before the Subcomm. on
Energy, National Resources, and the Environment
of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., ser. 10, (1969) [hereinafter 1969 Senate
Comm. Hearings].
35 1969 SENATE REPORT 2.
every state the sale or purchase of species
taken illegally from any other state, the
Act would reduce incentive for domestic
poaching.3 6
Sections 1 through 5 of the 1969 Act
deal with the importation of endangered
species into the United States. Sections 1
and 2 provide definition of terms and
clarification of references in the Act. Sub-
section 3(a) instructs the Secretary of the
Interior, on the basis of scientific and
commercial information,3 7 and after con-
sultation with various groups,'3 to develop
a list of species or subspecies of wildlife
or fish which, in his judgment, are threat-
ened with worldwide extinction.3 9 Subsec-
tion 3(b) authorizes the Secretary to per-
mit the importation of a listed endangered
species up to one year after its listing in
order to minimize any undue economic
hardship to a person who had contracted
to import that species before it was deter-
mined to be endangered. 40 A limited ex-
36 Id. 4.
37 16 U.S.C. § 668cc-3(a) (1970). The Senate
and House Reports indicated that prior to publi-
cation of the list of endangered species the Secre-
tary would seek advice and assistance from sev-
eral scientific organizations, the most prominent
of which was the IUCN.
38 The groups to be consulted were specialists
from the fields of zoology, ornithology, herpetol-
ogy, and ichthyology as well as representatives of
Federal and State Governments. 1969 SENATE
REPORT 5.
39 U.S. List of Endangered Foreign Fish and
Wildlife, 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1971). After the
Secretary compiled a list of endangered species
he would be required to review this entire list at
least once every five years. 1969 SENATE REPORT
5.
40 50 C.F.R. § 17.12 (1971). This regulation
seeks to clarify the basis for the importer's undue
economic hardship request and through an ap-
pended questionnaire ascertain its validity.
ception to the importation prohibition is
given in subsection 3(c) for certain bona-
fide scientific purposes, 4' and subsection
3(d) provides that regulations must com-
ply with the Administrative Procedure Act
requirements. 42
Section 4 is one of the enforcement pro-
visions of the Act. It establishes civil and
criminal penalties43 for violation of the
importation prohibitions. Provision is also
made in section 4 for court review of penal-
ties, 44 seizure of wildlife,45 forfeiture pro-
41 This exception would apply to listed species
brought into the country for zoological, educa-
tional, scientific, or propagation purposes al-
though there is no blanket exception for any
purpose. 16 U.S.C. § 688cc-3(c) (1970).
42 Id. § 688cc-3(d). Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970) provides that publi-
cation of any proposed rulemaking shall be pub-
lished in the Federal Register and that all inter-
ested parties shall have an opportunity to submit
written data or to make oral arguments with
respect to the proposed rule. However, the Act
did not include reference to the hearing and
judicial review requirements under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act and therefore there are
no such requirements binding on the Secretary.
43 16 U.S.C. § 668cc-4(a)(1)(b) (1970). The
Secretary is authorized to assess a civil penalty
of not more than $5,000 for each violation, or
for a willful violation, a criminal penalty of not
more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more
than one year, or both. No penalty can be
assessed until such person is given notice and
an opportunity for a hearing wih respect to the
alleged violation. 1969 SENATE REPORT 9.
44 16 U.S.C. § 668cc-4(a) (1970). The Secre-
tary is authorized, in the event of failure to com-
ply with his penalty assessment, to request the
Attorney General to institute a civil action in a
U.S. district court to collect the penalty. The dis-
trict court has the authority, in such an action,
to review de novo both the violation and the as-
sessment of the civil penalty. 1969 SENATE RE-
PORT 8.
45 16 U.S.C. § 668cc-4(a) (2) (1970). The au-
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ceedings, 46 and a limitation of ports of
entry for wildlife and fish.4 7 Section 5
emphasizes the need for international co-
operation and provides encouragement to
that end.
48
Sections 7 through 10 deal with the
interstate transportation, sale, or purchase
of endangered species. Section 7 amends
existing law4 9 by prohibiting in all states
the sale of wildlife taken illegally in any
other state. Section 8 amends existing
law50 by authorizing the Secretary to pro-
vide other reasonable means of marking
thority provided here is in addition to other au-
thority provided by law relating to search and
seizure in order to insure that the powers of
Customs officials are in no way limited by this
Act. 1969 SENATE REPORT 8.
46 16 U.S.C. § 668cc-4(a)(2) (1970). The Sec-
retary must seek forfeiture in a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction and must dispose of the civil
penalty proceedings before seeking forfeiture.
However, forfeiture is automatic upon a criminal
conviction. In addition, if a forfeiture action
is not commenced within 30 days following the
assessment of the civil penalty, the seized ma-
terial is to be immediately returned to the
owner. 1969 SENATE REPORT 8.
47 16 U.S.C. § 668cc-4(d) (1970). This sub-
section was designed to facilitate the enforce-
ment of the importation prohibitions of the Act.
For a listing of the ports of entry see 50 C.F.R.
§H 17.1-17.16 (app. B 1970).
48 16 U.S.C. 668cc-5(b)-(c) (1970). The Sec-
retary, working through the Secretary of State,
is directed to seek the convening of an interna-
tional ministerial meeting on fish and wildlife
prior to June 30, 1971, for the purpose of sign-
ing a binding international convention for the
conservation of endangered species. Authoriza-
tion for appropriation of $200,000 is given for
the purpose of implementing this provision. 1969
SENATE REPORT 11.
49 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 687,
as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 43 (1970).
50 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat 687,
as aniended, 18 U.S.C. § 44 (1970).
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the contents of packages containing wild-
life when present marking creates a sig-
nificant possibility of theft. Sections 9 and
10 deal with the revision of fish and bird
provisions. 5
Section 6, an important provision, de-
clares that the Lacey Act as amended
5 2
will not be limited or superceded by any
of the provisions of this Act. Section 11
provides for the effective date of the Act,
and section 12 increases the allotment
given to the Secretary for land acquisition
under the 1966 Act.53
When the effectiveness of the Act is
measured against its stated purposes, sev-
eral deficiencies are manifest. First, before
a species can be listed as endangered by
the Secretary it must be threatened with
worldwide extinction. The Senate Report
indeed emphasizes that serious reduction
in numbers of a species is insufficient rea-
son for protection unless the reduction is
worldwide. 54  Expert testimony at the
Senate and House hearings on the bill
voiced disapproval with this test,55 for the
51 16 U.S.C. § 852 (1970), amending Black Bass
Act of 1926, ch. 346, 44 Stat. 852; 16 U.S.C.
§ 705 (1970), amending Migratory Bird Treaty
Act of 1918 ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755.
52 1969 SENATE REPORT 3.
53 1969 SENATE REPORT 2.
54 The allotment for acquisition of lands or
waters for any one area was increased from
$750,000 to $2,500,000. Id. 2-3.
55 At the hearings, Lloyd Tupling, a Sierra Club
representative, made the following statement:
"As time is of the essence and each moment
wasted may bring the extinction of anyone of
the hundreds of animals threatened, we suggest
that wording be added which would immedi-
ately establish as endangered and protected
by such legislation the birds and mammals
listed in the IUCN "Red Data Books."
provision is clearly inadequate, as it allows
for the serious endangerment of a species
without affording the protection which is
the very purpose of the Act. In fact, an
argument can be made that in many cases
species of high commercial value are ex-
cluded from listing until their chances of
preservation are precarious at best. The
following examples illustrate the force of
this contention.
The Endangered Species List includes
only four of the seven accepted races of
tiger.56 Bali, Javan, Caspian, and Sumatran
tiger are included, 57 thus excluding Chi-
nese, Bengal, and Siberian or Amur tiger.
Of the included races all are faced with
near extinction based on the most authori-
tative information.58 Of the excluded races,
however, two are listed as endangered in
the Red Data Book and the Bengal tiger
1969 Senate Comm. Hearings, at 73. At the
House hearings, Louis Clapper of the National
Wildlife Federation, offered the following sug-
gestions:
We believe that conformance to criteria de-
veloped by the IUCN will add a credence that
can be valuable in international negotiations
and deliberations . . . . We suggest that the
committee clarify that position of section 2
which relates to "worldwide extinction" . . . .
1969 House Comm. Hearings, at 127.
56 THE PRINCE PHILIP, DUKE OF EDINBURGH &
J. FISHER, WILDLIFE CRISIS 239-40 (1970) [here-
inafter WILDLIFE CRISIS]. This is the only docu-
ment of its kind to be prepared with the ap-
proval and assistance of the World Wildlife Fund
and the IUCN. A section at the end of the work
offers a well-illustrated compendium of extinct
and endangered birds and mammals as listed by
the 1UCN's Red Data Book. Id. 217-48.
57 See U.S. List of Endangered Foreign Fish and
Wildlife, 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1971).
58 WILDLIFE CRISIS 239. All four races are in
such danger as to have earned a red sheet in the
Red Data Book-"a critically endangered form."
faces imminent endangerment status.5 9 The
excluded races of tiger would certainly
seem to be well qualified for listing by the
1969 Act in view of their high commercial
value and endangered status, yet protection
is not forthcoming. Urgent pleas by in-
terested parties evince the seriousness of
the situation. 60
Of the six races of leopard listed as
endangered by the Red Data Book only
three are included on the protected list.61
The included races, Sinai, Barbary, and
Anatolian leopard, are near extinction. 2
The excluded races again meet the criteria
for protection but have been ignored. For
example, the Snow Leopard, although exist-
59 Id. 239. The Siberian tiger is estimated at 100-
120 in number with only 149 in captivity; the
Chinese tiger has a wide range in China but
within it is very rare and fractionated into relict
populations under considerable hunting pressures;
and the Bengal tiger, with its principal habitat in
India, has a rapidly deterioratine status.
60 NATIONAL PARKS AND CONSERVATION MAGA-
ZINE, Aug., 1971, at 21. Arjan Singh, owner
of a tiger farm in India is alarmed at the de-
teriorating status of the tiger,
South India has almost lost the tiger, but we
can still save the tiger in the north if we can
control the export of skins. The Kingdom of
Nepal poses a direct threat to the operation of
an export ban. The 800 mile border between
Nepal and India is mainly a tiger habitat and
is almost entirely uncontrolled. . . . The way
is clear to the tiger's early disappearance unless
Nepal can be persuaded to enforce a ban on
tiger hunting also.
61 U.S. List of Endangered Foreign Fish and
Wildlife, 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1971).
62 WILDLIFE CRISIS 239-40. The Barbary leopard
exists in just one part of Morocco, where it is
doubtful whether 100 survive; the Sinai leopard
is most probably extinct; and the Anotolian
leopard survives in only relict populations in
Turkey, Israel, Syria, Jordan, and possibly Leb-
anon.
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ing in several areas, has a total estimated
population of only 400 with 90 in cap-
tivity.63
The clear intent of the 1969 Act was to
protect against the commercial exploitation
of wildlife. Yet the exclusions of tiger and
leopard illustrate a distinct deficiency in
the enforcement of the Act. The exclusion
of such commercially valuable species can
only sanction their exploitation, and in this
respect the Act works as a sword against
the excluded animals.
A second major drawback of the 1969
Act stems from an identification problem.
Since many subspecies resemble each
other, those that are endangered often
cannot be distinguished from those that
are not. Although, as indicated above, all
tigers should be considered endangered,
they are not all listed and thus provide a
good example of another problem with
the enforcement of the Act. When tiger
skins are imported customs inspectors
simply cannot distinguish the hides of one
subspecies, or race, from another. 64 An-
other example of this problem is the trade
in crocodile hides. The Nile crocodile, al-
though on the Endangered Species List,
cannot be effectively protected under the
1969 Act because few can distinguish its
hide from other non-endangered crocodile
hides. 65
This identification problem has been
capitalized on by poachers, who smuggle
63 Id. 240.
64 NATURAL HISTORY, May 1971, at 10. This
article was written by Dr. Wayne King, curator
of herpetology at the New York Zoological Soci-
ety, a herpetologist of high repute.
65 Id. at 10.
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illegally taken skins into countries where
the species are not protected. The skins
can then be sold openly or, as is more
often the case, exported to the United
States. When imported into this country
the identification problem manifests itself
again as no one can tell where a particular
hide has come from originally.
This problem of trans-shipment or the
smuggling of skins into unprotected coun-
tries for export, has been of major sig-
nificance. United States government sta-
tistics66  substantiate this in several
instances. During 1968 and 1969, 3,422
leopard skins were imported from Kenya,
of which 2,051 skins represented trans-
shipped, or poached skins. 67 Ethiopia vir-
tually stopped legal export of leopard and
cheetah skins in 1968, issuing only one
permit for six leopard skins and no permits
for cheetah skins. Yet in 1968, 2,304
leopard skins and 178 cheetah skins were
imported into the United States from Ethi-
opia.68 These poached and smuggled skins
entered Ethiopia as legal imports and re-
ceived legal export papers, which were
then used to import the skins into the
66 United States Imports of Merchandise for
Consumption, U.S. Dep't of Commerce IM 146
(leopard and cheetah skins imported to the United
States from Ethiopia).
67 Id. Poached and smuggled leopard skins from
Africa and Asia were shipped to other countries
without papers, but could not enter the United
States without papers from the country of origin.
The skins were then shipped back to Kenya
where having entered as legal imports they re-
ceived legal export papers, with which they
could now enter the United States. Examples of
countries shipping skins back into Kenya for
export to the United States included Great Brit-
ain (623 skins) and Switzerland (122 skins). Id.
68 Id.
United States. Another glaring example of
trans-shipment resulted from India's pro-
hibition of leopard skin exports in July,
1968. By October, 1968, the bordering
country of Nepal, up to then not an ex-
porter of leopard skins, began exportation.
When the United States refused any further
shipments from India in May, 1969, the
export traffic from Nepal jumped from 36
skins in May to 721 in June.6 9 Trans-ship-
ment has become so widespread that im-
port agents are at a loss to cope with the
problem.70
In order to effectively combat the iden-
tification problem and its trans-shipment
ramifications, it is imperative that all en-
dangered species and the subspecies with
which they can be confused be denied
import. The Endangered Species List of
the 1969 Act is clearly inadequate in this
respect.
There are three other potential weak-
nesses in the 1969 Act pertaining to the
exercise of discretion by the Secretary.
First, the enforcement apparatus of section
4,71 including penalty assessment, court en-
forcement, and forfeiture proceedings, is
cumbersome and requires great initiative
from the Secretary to be effective. Second,
the grace period for importers in subsec-
tion 3 (b)72 might permit importers to use
69 Id. The 800 mile border between India and
Nepal makes the prevention of smuggling im-
possible. See note 60.
70 NATURAL HISTORY, at 10.
71 See notes 42-46 supra.
72 See 50 C.F.R. § 17.12 (1971). This subsec-
tion was the subject of some interest during the
Senate hearings. For example, see the statement
of Walter Boardman, consultant on conserva-
tion, National Parks Association, 1969 Senate
Commn. Hearings, at 74.
undue economic hardship as an excuse to
enter into long term contracts with foreign
agents. Third, the amendment to existing
law in section 813 liberalizing marking re-
quirements for packages containing wildlife
can effectively destroy once strong marking
provisions. In all these instances the poten-
tial for abuse is great and must be zealously
guarded against through the Secretary's
discretionary powers.
II. State Protection-The Mason Act
New York State Assemblyman Edwyn
E. Mason, as chairman of the Committee
on Agriculture, introduced a bill to the
1970 Legislature which sought to prohibit
the sale or possession in New York of
enumerated endangered species.74  The
measure was intended to supplement the
federal Endangered Species Conservation
Act 75 and effectively cut off the fur and
73 18 U.S.C. § 43 (1970), amending Act of
June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 687.
74 NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE RECORD AND INDEX
A 401 (1970), Assembly Bill No. 4270-B, 193d
Sess. (1970), enacted as N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS.
LAW § 358-a (McKinney 1970) recited in per-
tinent part as follows:
Sale of certain wild animals or wild animal
products prohibited. 1. no part of the skin
or body, whether raw or manufactured, of the
following species of wild animals or the animal
itself may be sold or offered for sale . . . after
the effective date of this section:-Leopard,
Snow Leopard, Clouded Leopard, Tiger, Chee-
tah, Alligators, Caiman or Crocodile of the
Order Crocodylia, Vicuna, Red Wolf, or Polar
Bear, nor after a period of twelve months from
the effective date of this section, of the follow-
ing species: -Mountain Lion, sometimes called
Cougar, Jaguar, Ocelot, or Margay. (Scientific
names excluded).
75 NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 125 (1970),
Memorandum of Assemblyman Edwyn E. Mason,
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leather trade in New York.76 Mason rea-
soned that since the world center of the
fur industry is located in New York City,
prohibition of the use of skins of endan-
gered species would be a great step toward
preserving these species from extinction. 77
Apparently Mason was also aware of the
weaknesses of the federal Act, as his bill
enumerated all races of tiger, leopard, and
crocodylia in addition to other species not
on the federal list. 78
A similar bill was introduced by As-
semblyman Glenn Harris during the 1970
session. 79 The major difference was that
the Harris bill did not enumerate any
species but defined as endangered those
species designated by the federal list and
vested the New York State Commission of
Environmental Conservation with the
power to amplify the federal list by ad-
dition of those species which he considered
endangered. Both bills eventually passed
the New York State legislature and were
due to go into effect on September 1,
1970. s °
However, in July, 1970, suit was brought
in the State Supreme Court, Onondaga
County, by the A. E. Nettleton Company,
a men's shoe manufacturer, testing the con-
stitutionality of both the Mason and Harris
Assembly Bill No. 4270-B, ch. 1048 (Feb. 3,
1970).
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE RECORD AND INDEX
A 567 (1970), Assembly Bill No. 5876-A, 193d
Sess. (Feb. 17, 1970).
80 N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 358-a (McKin-
ney 1970); N.Y. CONSERV. LAW § 187 (McKin-
ney 1970).
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Acts.8 1 The plaintiff industry attacked the
power of the state to legislate in the area
of wildlife preservation, 2 and argued that
the enactments violated both the Suprem-
acy Clause and the Commerce Clause of
the Federal Constitution.83 The court re-
jected the contention that the federal act
pre-empted state legislation under the
Supremacy Clause8 4 and sustained the con-
stitutionality of the Harris Act. However,
the Mason Act was held unconstitutional
on the ground that it was an unreasonable
exercise of the state police power and de-
prived the industry of property without due
process of law.8 5 On appeal, the Court of
81 Nettleton Co. v. Diamond, 63 Misc. 2d 885,
313 N.Y.S.2d 893 (Onondaga County 1970).
82 The contention here was that Section 358-a
of the Agriculture & Markets Law had been pre-
empted by the Federal Endangered Species Act
of 1969 and was, therefore, unconstitutional
under clause 2 of article VI of the United States
Constitution. Nettleton Co. v. Diamond, 27 N.Y.
2d 182, 183, 264 N.E.2d 118, 121, 315 N.Y.S.2d
625, 626 (1970).
83 On the first point, the industry contended that
the federal Endangered Species Act pre-empted
the state Mason Act under the supremacy clause
of the Constitution. The second contention was
that the Mason Act constituted an unlawful bur-
den on the interstate and foreign commerce in
violation of clause 3 of section 8 of article I of
the United States Constitution. Industry made the
additional contention that the Mason Act violated
the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution and section 6 of article I of the New
York State Constitution in that it deprived plain-
tiff of his property without due process of law.
Nettleton Co. v. Diamond, 27 N.Y.2d 182, 183-
184 (1970). The last two contentions were sus-
tained by the State Supreme Court in holding the
Mason Act unconstitutional. Nettleton Co. v.
Diamond, 63 Misc. 2d at 895, 313 N.Y.S.2d at
904.
84 Nettleton Co. v. Diamond, 63 Misc. 2d at
890-92, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 899-901.
85) Id. at 895, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 904. The supreme
Appeals overturned the lower court by
affirming the constitutionality of the Mason
Act. In so deciding the Court agreed that
the federal act did not pre-empt the state
legislation of wildlife but differed with the
lower court on the propriety of the exercise
of state police power. The court upheld
the Mason Act as a reasonable exercise of
state police power under the facts of the
case. The rationale for this decision was
twofold: first, the Court noted that such
power was the least limitable power of
state government;, second, the Court as-
serted the ecological needs to be served by
the exercise of that power. On the latter
point the Court emphasized that wildlife
was a vital asset to the people, and that
protection was necessary not only for
aesthetic and scientific purposes but also
for the key role that wildlife played in the
maintenance of the life cycle. The Court's
opinion by Justice Scileppi was a strong
assertion of the need for, and the validity
of, the extension of state police power to
meet the threat to endangered wildlife.
court's conclusion that the Mason Act violated the
due process would seem to be based on an ante-
dated and narrow construction of the state's po-
lice power. Furthermore, the court seemed to be
substituting its judgment for that of the Legisla-
ture in striking down the Mason Act for exceeding
the bounds of necessity and being "unconstitu-
tionally oppressive." See Brief for Appellants at
11-20, Nettleton Co. v. Diamond, 27 N.Y.2d 182
(1970).
86 Nettleton Co. v. Diamond, 27 N.Y.2d at 192,
264 N.E.2d at 123, 315 N.Y.S.2d at 632. The
Court also rejected plaintiff's Commerce Clause
argument stating that the Mason Act merely pro-
hibited sale or offer for sale, within New York
State, of skins or products made from the for-
bidden species.
While Nettleton was moving up through
the state courts, Palladio, Inc., a Massachu-
setts shoe manufacturer, instituted action in
federal court also challenging the constitu-
tionality of the Mason Act and seeking
injunctive relief from its enforcement.8 7
Although agreeing to await the Nettleton
decision, Palladio pursued its remedy in
the district court after that ruling was
made. In addition to the averments of
constitutional infirmities made in Nettleton,
Palladio argued that the absence of hear-
ings on the Mason Act denied industry the
opportunity to voice its opinion."' The
Court noted that there was conflicting evi-
dence as to whether the hearings took
place,s9 but resolved the question by an-
swering that the legislature was not re-
quired to build a record,90 and alternately
that hearings held on the Harris bill could
be used to support the Mason bill.91 Al-
though the question of hearings may have
been in doubt, there is evidence 92 that
87 Palladio, Inc. v. Diamond, 321 F. Supp. 630
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
88 Id. at 632-33.
89 Id. at 633.
90 Id.
91 Id.
9 2 The evidence consists of affidavits, in the form
of notarized letters, written to Assemblyman
Mason from the heads of various foreign wild-
life agencies supporting the efforts contained in
the Mason Act. At the hearings two such letters
were read. One letter from, Humayan Abdulali,
the honorary secretary of the Bombay Natural
History Society, recited in part:
While the ban on the import of these skins and
the manufactures therefrom into the U.S.A.
as a whole would be invaluable, the prohibition
of their sale, even as confined to the State
of New York, would be very great assistance
in lessening the drain on the population of
these species in India.
The other letter was from Perez Malande
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representatives of foreign governments
voiced strong support for the passage of
the Mason Act. The district court, in an
enlightened opinion by Judge Mansfield,
denied Palladio's motion for injunctive re-
lief and convening of a three judge court,
and upheld the constitutionality of the
Mason Act.93 The United States Court of
Appeals, upon the subsequent appeal by
Palladio, affirmed the lower court decision
per curiam.94 On March 22, 1971, the
United States Supreme Court dismissed
an appeal challenging the New York Court
of Appeal's decision in Nettleton.9 5
Nettleton and Palladio have a broad
significance in wildlife legislation specifi-
cally and environmental law generally. Not
only did they uphold the power of a state
to protect wildlife outside its borders, their
Olindo, the director of the Kenya National Parks,
and in part it recited:
If there are no markets there can be no induce-
ment to poach .... This can only be achieved
if the countries outside Kenya where the mar-
kets exist enact the necessary protective legis-
lation.
Affidavit from Humayun Abdulali to Assembly-
man Mason, Sept. 11, 1970; affidavit from Perez
Malande Olindo to Assemblyman Mason, Sept.
14, 1970.
93 Palladio, Inc. v. Diamond, 321 F. Supp. at
631. The opinion began as follows:
It is now generally recognized that the destruc-
tion or disturbance of vital life cycles or of
the balance of a species of wildlife, even
though initiated in one part of the world, may
have a profound effect upon the health and
welfare of people in other distant parts. We
have come to appreciate the interdependence
of different forms of life. We realize that by
killing certain species in one area we may
sound our own death knell.
94 Palladio, Inc. v. Diamond, 440 F.2d 1319
(2d Cir. 1971).
95 Reptile Products Ass'n, Inc. v. A.E. Nettleton,
401 U.S. 969 (1971).
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language96 indicated a definite deference to
environmental concern and sanctioned the
greatest expansion of police power to date
to enforce environmental law.97
The Mason Act has also had a marked
significance. It has effectively deterred com-
mercial exploitation of endangered species
by destroying the biggest market for their
sale; it has increased public awareness of
the threat of commercial endangerment of
wildlife;98 and it has encouraged other
states to adopt similar legislation in the
struggle to protect endangered wildlife. 99
06 See cases cited notes 86 & 93 supra. Judge
Mansfield's Palladio decision endorses several of
the expert affidavits contained in the appellant's
brief. For example, reference and quotation is
made in the opinion to statements of Dr. F.
Wayne King (supra note 64), Herndon Dowling,
research associate in the Department of Herpetol-
ogy of the American Museum of Natural History,
and William Conway, General Director of the
New York Zoological Society. Palladio, Inc. v.
Diamond, 321 F. Supp. at 634-35.
97 Note, Constitutional Problems in Environ-
mental Legislation-The Mason Law, 12 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REV. 657, 672-73 (1971). This
article traces the expansion of state police powers
in aesthetic and ecological cases while focusing
on the significance of the Nettleton decision. The
author concludes that Nettleton provides a log-
ical basis for the development of new state rem-
edies to meet environmental problems.
98 Periodicals and newspapers are giving in-
creased attention to wildlife endangerment. See,
e.g., U. S. NEWS, Nov. 2, 1970, at 81-82; TIME,
Mar. 28, 1969, at 54; LIFE, Nov. 27, 1970, at
46-57; SCIENCE, Jan. 9, 1970, at 152; N.Y. Times,
Jan. 4, 1970, at 48, col. 8. More specifically,
recent newspaper and television editorials warned
against an attempt by Assemblyman Harris to
destroy the effectiveness of the Mason Act. N.Y.
Times, Apr. 7, 1971, editorial; C.B.S. editorial,
May 8, 1971.
99 CAL. FISH. & G. CODE §§ 2050-2055 (West
Supp. 1971). California has had a progressive
III. Conclusion-The Danger
of Victory
Although unilateral action such as the
Endangered Species Conservation Act and
the Mason Act are steps in the right direc-
tion, more meaningful protection for en-
dangered species lies in multilateral agree-
ment. Only through international coopera-
tion can endangered species be realistically
protected. The future existence of wildlife
and fish depends on the development of
effective international conventions.
Recent times have seen the growth of
international conventions as world concern
over diminishing wildlife increases. These
conventions have been both fruitful and
horribly disappointing. Since 1911 a four
power treaty has restricted the ocean kill-
ing of seals; consequently the seal herd
has increased from a low of 200,000 in
1911 to 11/3-million animals today.100
However, in 1946 a whaling convention
was signed by seventeen nations, estab-
lishing an International Whaling Commis-
sion, 10 1 but the past two decades has seen
an unprecedented slaughter of whales, as
the signatories argue over killing rights to
a dying species. 0 2
record in wildlife protection and recently added
the above cited endangered species provision to
its statutes. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 26-55
(Supp. 1971). This enactment, approved on
May 16, 1971, prohibits the exportation, sale, or
exchange of listed species without prior approval
of a designated board. PA. STAT. §§ 1351, 1352
(Supp. 1971). This enactment, approved on
July 30, 1971, is very similar to the Mason Act
and illustrates best the latter's effect on other
states.
100 16 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970).
101 16 U.S.C. § 916 (1970), formerly Act of
Aug. 9, 1950, ch. 653, §§ 2-14, 64 Stat. 421-25.
102 WILDLIFE IN DANGER 60-66.
Aside from the lack of multilateral co-
operation, the primary difficulty in the
enforcement of international conventions
is the inability of countries to control their
exports.10 3 A seemingly progressive pro-
posal would be for each country to enact
a Lacey Act. By refusing importation of
any species prohibited export by a foreign
country, the government will have taken a
meaningful step in the direction of inter-
national cooperation for the preservation
of endangered species.
103 See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
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Ecological concern is emerging as a hall-
mark of our time. However, unless concern
is translated into positive action it will be
too late for wildlife. For a species once
lost is lost forever. This concluding thought
is offered for the skeptic:
In the long war on wildlife man has steadily
advanced and wildlife retreated. We are
now in danger of achieving total victory. In
such a victory we would surely find cata-
strophic defeat. 10 4
104 NATIONAL PARKS AND CONSERVATION MAGA-
ZINE, Mar. 1971, at 17.
